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 Abstract 
This working paper investigates support for state in the European Union cross-nationally and 
longitudinally using data from the European Values Survey. Analyses are carried out at 
different levels. At the individual level, we go beyond the opposition between self-interest and 
symbolic orientations by showing that they both matter and combine to influence statist 
attitudes. At group level, we assess the issue of parallel opinion moves over time and find 
uniform, although divided, trends among subpublics. At the country level, we suggest that 
dynamics of opinion respond to changes in the economic environment, but do not necessarily 
respond according to a thermostatic model. Our results thus prove relevant for the European 
case most of the findings previous scholars have highlighted for the American case. 
 
 
 
Many cross-national polls today provide evidence of a widespread distrust of 
capitalism in Europe. In 2009, the opinion that “free market capitalism has some problems, 
but these can be addressed through more regulation and reform” is shared by a majority of 
respondents in Germany (75 percent), Italy (59 percent), United-Kingdom (57 percent) and 
Spain (56 percent). In France (47 percent), it is neck and neck with the alternative opinion that 
“free market capitalism is fatally flawed, and a different economic system is needed” (43 
percent) (GlobeScan-BBC World Service 2009). In another survey conducted at the end of 
2010, France and Italy appear to be the most averse to capitalism among European countries. 
In the two countries, 52 percent of the respondents declare that it “works rather badly but that 
it is necessary to keep it because there is no other alternative”. Distrust of capitalism is 
important as well in Great Britain (45 percent), Germany (42 percent) and Netherlands (38 
percent) (IFOP-La Croix 2010). 
The mainstream media usually assume that the Great Recession has elicited a sudden 
reversal of public confidence in market economy. Contrary to this common opinion, distrust 
of capitalism was high in many European countries well before 2007-2008. According to a 
poll conducted for the University of the Maryland, 50 percent of the French, 32 percent of the 
Germans, 31 percent of the Italians, 28 percent of the Spaniards and 27 percent of the British 
were already disagreeing, in summer 2005, with the statement that “the free enterprise system 
and free market economy is the best system on which to base the future of the world” 
(GlobeScan-PIPA 2006). This survey, also conducted in 2003, 2005 and 2007, suggests that 
support for capitalism has been stepping back in Europe since the beginning of the 2000s 
(GlobeScan-PIPA 2008). 
These survey results are somewhat at odds with the popular belief that globalization 
might fuel public demand for market capitalism and hence generate uniform economic 
attitudes. Still, while many scholars have proved European attitudes to show no sign of 
convergence on moral issues1, the convergence of economic values remains a controversial 
topic. For some, globalization shapes similar attitudes and behaviors in the economic realm, 
thereby leveling national differences. For others, trends toward economic homogenization are 
dampened down by specific cultural traits or by peculiar institutional arrangements. This 
article challenges the view of converging economic values by investigating how economic 
attitudes have moved in the European Union since the beginning of the 1990s. 
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 Attitudes toward family, marriage or gender relations are moving for example at the same speed toward more 
equality (Inglehart and Norris 2003). 
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Theoretical and Empirical Background about Shifts and Changes in Economic 
Attitudes 
 
In political science, the issue of shifts and changes in economic attitudes is usually 
addressed from two different perspectives. For the upholders of a “minimalist” paradigm 
(Sniderman 1993), the general public pays little attention to economy and lacks the 
knowledge to form opinions on economic matters. Economic attitudes are mostly driven by 
superficial and erratic reactions to contextual information, such as the perceived changes of 
economic conjuncture or the way political elites and mainstream media frame economic 
issues. Thus economic attitudes appear to be unstable and inconsistent. They are comparable 
to “pseudo-opinions” or “non-attitudes” (Converse 2006). 
In reaction against this approach, many scholars have emphasized that ordinary people 
are capable of reasoning about political and economic issues (e.g., Zaller 1992; Sniderman, 
Brody, and Tetlock 1993; Popkin 1994; Saris and Sniderman 2004). Another argument has 
been put forward. Even if individual opinions are likely to get wrong, public opinion can be 
considered as rational in the aggregate. Individual errors tend to cancel out at the aggregated 
level, so that collective opinion provides a better understanding of citizens real preferences 
(Page and Shapiro 1992; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Enns and Kellstedt 2008). 
One question has been particularly sensitive for the development of new perspectives 
on public opinion: To what extent the rationality in aggregate opinion movements is mirrored 
among all strata of population? Answering this question, Page and Shapiro (1992) formulated 
what can be referred to as the “parallel publics” thesis. They asserted that social groups tend 
to change their opinions at the same time, in the same direction, in the same proportions and 
for the same reasons. Sharply contrasting with the idea that “public opinion does not exist” 
since subgroups have competing interests (Bourdieu 1973), this thesis stems from the 
empirical observation that dynamics of public opinion present uniform patterns. Regarding 
economic attitudes, it assumes for example that subgroups do not strongly differ in the way 
they perceive economic events; i.e., in the way they receive cues about the economy and 
accordingly update their attitudes. Therefore, subgroups will somehow react in concert and 
move as a whole. 
For the American case, the “parallel publics” thesis has been fairly well supported by 
survey data. Using the General Social Survey series from 1972 to 1988, Page and Shapiro’s 
seminal work first showed striking evidences of parallel opinion movements on economic 
issue, notably among income groups. With a GSS cumulative file spanning 1973 to 1996, 
Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (2002) have also pointed out dynamics of uniform opinion 
changes. They found that public preferences for more or less government tend to move evenly 
across the segments of the population with different educational attainment. Enns and 
Kellstedt (2008) used GSS and American National Election Studies (ANES) data to replicate 
and extend these findings. They confirmed that the least and the most sophisticated strata of 
American society change their opinions in tandem. Exploring public preferences for 
government spending and welfare issues with GSS data from 1974 to 2004, Ura and Ellis 
(2008) came to the same conclusion of overtime similarity between incomes quartiles. They 
also showed that marginally, income groups do not react identically and that the wealthy are 
more responsive to economic stimuli. 
Among the large body of cross-national studies investigating economic attitudes in 
Europe, the issue of uniform opinion movements has – to our knowledge – never been 
analyzed per se. Our paper intends to fill this gap by gauging the empirical validity of the 
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“parallel publics” thesis with data from the European Values Survey (EVS), a longitudinal 
survey research program on basic human values conducted since 19812.  
Addressing specifically the topic of public attitudes toward state, we first present a 
global picture of the data and the main descriptive results on how statist attitudes have 
evolved in the European Union between 1990 and 2008. Then, we use factor analysis and 
multilevel modeling to determine what influences support for state. We notably investigate – 
what is rarely done in the literature – how the major predictors of statist attitudes interplay. 
We also investigate how they combine with political interest, which is known to be a 
powerful mediator of social attitudes. 
In the second part of the article, we deal with the question of subpublics movements 
and assess whether they have been shifting in concert since 1990. We also examine the extent 
to which movements of the general public are driven by certain subgroups, supposed to be 
more responsive to changes. Finally, trying to reconcile micro- and macro-level dynamics, we 
consider global inequalities and public policies indicators to provide an explanation for the 
increasing support for state in the European Union. Our findings indicate that the European 
public reacts when political elites answer to the growing demand for state protection, but does 
not necessarily react according to a “thermostatic” model (Wlezien 1995). Thus we discuss in 
closing the linkage between public opinion and public policies, pointing in particular the topic 
of democratic responsiveness in European welfare regimes. 
 
 
Data, Descriptive Overview and Methods 
 
A Uniform Decrease of Public Preferences for Economic Liberalism 
 
Unlike the polls mentioned above, the European Values Survey permits to compare a 
wide array of countries and to put into perspective various aspects of economic liberalism. 
Since the second wave of the EVS in 19903, the European are asked to position themselves on 
a battery of ten-point agreement scales, capturing their economic attitudes with two opposite 
propositions, one typical of a conservative orientation, the other typical of a liberal 
orientation. Three questions depict the doctrinal pillars of economic liberalism: competition, 
private ownership of means of production and state control over firms. Other questions tap 
opinions about the role of individuals in market economy by addressing individual 
responsibility, income equality and normative constraints regarding unemployment. 
Looking at Figure 1, we can see a progressive erosion of liberal preferences since the 
beginning of 1990s. This erosion is particularly sharp on questions illustrating the major 
principles of the liberal doctrine. Support for private property and competition respectively 
lose about 15 and 10 points of percentage. Crosstabs by country4 show that liberal preferences 
tend to step back quite evenly within the European Union. This is the case for private 
property, even though it falls more in the Baltic States (Latvia, Estonia) and in countries of 
the former Soviet Union (Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic) where the economy has been 
gradually liberalized since the beginning of the 1990s. Though a majority of Europeans (58 
percent) remains favorable to competition in 2008, support for competition decreases in both 
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 For presentation and substantive results, see e.g., Ester, Braun, and Mohler 2006; Halman 2008; Halman, 
Sieben, and Zundert 2012. 
3
 The last EVS wave covers forty-seven countries in 2008. For the purpose of comparison, we first focus on the 
twenty-seven countries of the European Union and, in further analysis, on the twenty-three countries that 
participated the last three waves. 
4
 Summary of variables, descriptive statistics and crosstabs are available upon request. 
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rich Western countries (Spain, France, Belgium) and less economically developed Oriental 
countries (Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania).  
The trend is very similar for the item opposing individual effort and wage equality. 
Globally lowering from 52 to 34 percent between 1990 and 2008, the opinion that individual 
effort should be encouraged is less accepted in Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, 
Poland, Estonia, Romania, Slovenia) and in many rich Northern countries (Finland, Sweden, 
Austria, Germany). This growing demand for equality is prominent in another question of the 
EVS. Preference for equality over freedom5 has raised from 36 percent in 1990 to 42 percent 
in 2008. This increase is rather homogeneous, as strong in unequal countries (Italy, Latvia, 
Estonia and Germany where the Gini coefficient is superior to 30 in 2008) as in more equal 
countries of Northern and Eastern Europe (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Czech Republic and 
Hungary, where the Gini coefficient ranges between 24 and 26.3). 
The aggregate opinions about individual responsibility and duties of the unemployed 
give a misleading impression of overtime stability. In fact, they move very differently from 
one country to another. The idea that individuals should take care of their own needs is much 
more supported in liberal countries (United Kingdom and Ireland). It is also increasing in 
these countries, where individuals are supposed to meet their needs and where the government 
is supposed to replace the market only to correct social handicaps individuals are not 
responsible for. Public preferences for individual responsibility increase as well in most of 
Eastern countries, probably boosted by the transition from a communist economy to a liberal 
economy insisting on individual initiative. Individual responsibility is less accepted in social 
democracies of Western Europe (Italy, Belgium, France and Netherlands) and Northern 
Europe (Denmark, Sweden, Finland) where “decommodification” – i.e., extension of the 
public realm – is historically rooted. As often mentioned in the literature about welfare 
regimes (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen 1999; Blekesaune and Quadagno 
2003), support for public coverage of social needs mainly reflects embedded cultural traits. 
The institutional arrangements may also help to understand expectations toward the 
unemployed. The opinion that the unemployed should accept any job available is low and 
decreasing in Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Sweden), certainly in linkage with social 
policies guaranteeing both flexibility for the employers and decent standard of living for the 
unemployed. On the other hand, it is increasing in several Western and Eastern countries 
(United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary), maybe echoing 
employment policies making unemployment assistance conditional on active job search. 
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 Respondents are invited to agree with one of these three statements: “(1) I find that both freedom and equality 
are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom more important, that 
is, everyone can live in freedom and develop without hindrance (2) Certainly both freedom and equality are 
important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider equality more important, that is, that 
nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong (3) Neither.” 
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Figure 1. Evolution of Conservative vs Liberal Attitudes in the European Union between 1990 
and 2008 
 
 
Stressing the dramatically growing disaffection of the Europeans for market economy, 
the EVS are in line with the polls mentioned above. But also showing that this disaffection 
varies among countries and depending on the facets of economic liberalism, they depict a 
more balanced portrait of the Europeans. The general public somehow combines an increasing 
demand for state intervention, with a high support of certain aspects of the liberal doctrine. 
With Figure 2, we reinforce this interpretation using Cronbach’s alpha to gauge the 
correlation between the six questions displayed in Figure 1. In 2008, the global correlation is 
quite weak for the 27 countries of the European Union (α=0.482; α jumps to 0.584 when the 
item about wage equality is deleted). This result highlights that Europeans endorse different, 
if not opposed economic preferences. It also confirms that the general public is not 
“ideological” (Converse 2006), since economic attitudes are not systematically organized. It 
must however be noted that economic attitudes are more consistent in Scandinavian countries 
(Sweden, Finland, Denmark) and in Northern Europe (United-Kingdom, Netherlands, 
Belgium, Germany). Certainly because the opposition between market and state is more 
institutionalized in these countries (Arts and Gelissen 2002; Svallfors 2006). 
Political sophistication has been argued to influence the ability of giving consistency 
to attitudes (e.g., Sears et al. 1980; Feldman and Zaller 1992). To assess this influence, we 
have computed an additive scale with highly correlated variables concerning personal interest 
in politics, its importance in everyday life, the frequency of political discussions with friends 
and the follow-up of current political events (α=0.75)6. Figure 2 confirms that the most 
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 The wordings are as follows: « How important is politics in your life? Very important, quite important, not 
important, not at all important »; « When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political 
matters frequently, occasionally or never? »; « How interested would you say you are in politics? Very 
7 
politically interested (i.e., the upper quartile of the index) combine their economic preferences 
in a more systematic pattern. Educational attainment is also known to be a relevant indicator 
of attitudinal consistency – the most educated being generally able to align their opinions and 
behaviors – and to be linked with political sophistication. Figure 2 shows that the most 
politically interested Europeans tend to be more economically consistent when they have 
received tertiary education. Still, some Eastern countries are bucking the trend. In Estonia, 
Slovakia, Poland and Hungary, a high level of education offsets the influence of political 
interest. It seems that in these countries, the tension between market and state is a more 
controversial matter among the most educated than among the rest of the citizens. 
 
Figure 2. Consistency of Economic Attitudes across the European Union in 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disentangling Economic Attitudes 
 
Our descriptive findings suggest that the growing distrust of the Europeans in market 
capitalism is not a homogeneous phenomenon. It conveys trends that are likely to move 
differently among countries and among social groups. Various statistical methods are 
available to make sense of the underlying dimensions captured by a set of scale variables. In 
some cases, scholars generate an additive index as their dependent variable by aggregating 
survey questions. Another option is to employ a factorial combination or some other latent 
class analysis technique. Here, we used principal components analysis (PCA), a particularly 
suited method to disentangle and prioritize within composite logics of answers. To get a 
global picture of these dimensions and a better measurement of their overtime variations, we 
grouped in a pooled dataset the 23 countries that participated the last three EVS waves. Each 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, not at all interest »; « How often do you follow politics in 
the news on television or on the radio or in the daily papers? Every day, several times a week, once or twice a 
week, less often, never. » 
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country is represented by a national subsample of equal size for 1990, 1999 and 2008. About 
1000 individuals by country and by round have been randomly selected. All in all, the 
aggregated dataset contains 68472 respondents. 
With a varimax rotation, the PCA yielded two factors (Table 1), pointing out that 
economic attitudes within the European Union are grounded on two main dimensions7. The 
first factor, by far the strongest and the easiest to interpret, can be described as an 
interventionism dimension. It accounts for 30 percent of the total variance and gathers most of 
the items about state control over economy. Though bubbling up from data with different 
items and less points in time, this dimension is remarkably akin to the Policy Mood, a time-
series index actually designed to approximate a principal components solution (Stimson 1999; 
Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002). Public preferences toward more or less government 
thus appear to be a central component of both the Europeans and the Americans economic 
attitudes. 
The equalitarian items tap a second dimension that accounts for a variance of 19 
percent of the total. This dimension is mainly structured by the opposition between 
respondents who declare that incomes should be more equal and those who say that there 
should be greater incentives for individual effort. The item stating that the unemployed should 
accept any job also loads quite highly on the second factor, suggesting that equalitarian 
expectations mostly refer to social cohesion and reciprocity (Bowles and Gintis 2000). 
Many techniques can be used to assess the cross-national reliability of attitudinal 
scales (Harkness 2010; Davidov, Schmidt, and Billiet 2011). We checked the robustness of 
our factors by performing separate PCA for each country and each EVS wave. This 
complementary analysis reveals that the structure of economic attitudes is very stable over 
time. Among the twenty-three countries examined, the ranking of the components, their 
content and the amount of variance they account for, barely change between 1990 and 2008. 
The conclusion clearly is that support for state and support for equality are prominent 
everywhere in the European Union. There is, however, an interesting exception with Northern 
countries. In Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Netherlands, statist and equalitarian items load 
on one single factor. It indicates that state and social equality are strongly linked in these 
countries. 
 
Table 1. Factor Loadings of Economic Attitudes (1990-2008, 23 Countries) 
  Support for state Support for equality 
The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone 
is provided for 0.70 0.05 
Government ownership of business and industry should be 
increased 0.64 0.26 
Competition is harmful 0.64 0.19 
People who are unemployed should have the right to refuse a job 
they do not want 0.60 -0.42 
Incomes should be made more equal 0.02 0.76 
Equality is more important than freedom 0.23 0.59 
 
To clarify the statistical effects across countries and to see how they combine with 
individual characteristics, we extracted the respondents’ scores – i.e., their assigned 
coordinates – on the first factor of the PCA. Then, we performed different multilevel linear 
models, after standardizing the variables to obtain comparable parameters and ease the 
interpretation. 
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 KMO (0.671) and Bartlett’s test (Chi-Square=17244.42 with p <0.001) indicate a reasonable correlation 
between the items. 
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Multilevel modeling is particularly appropriate for cases where individuals are 
clustered within different geographic units. While ordinary least squares regression assumes 
restrictive hypotheses as to the independence of error terms (i.e., errors are not correlated 
serially from one observation to the other; which is a problem with nested data where 
observations are assumed to be related among different groups) and homoscedasticity (i.e., 
homoscedastic pattern of errors are difficult to assume since heterogeneity can exist in the 
relations between observed groups) 8, multilevel modeling takes into account both dependence 
of observations and heterogeneity between error terms. On one hand, it permits a more 
complex specification of the residuals that are estimated at an individual-level and at an 
aggregate level. On the other hand, instead of constraining the variance of the residuals to be 
constant, it lets them vary depending on explanatory variables in order to assess variability 
between observed groups (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Hox 2010; Snijders and Bosker 2012). 
The primary objective of multilevel modeling is to explain micro-level variations in a 
dependent variable while controlling for variations in the mean response between different 
macro-levels of analysis. Table 2 displays models estimating the impact of different 
individual-level indicators on attitudes toward state. Model 1 provides, as a first step, the 
variance explained by country- and individual-level. This “empty” model with no explanatory 
variable permits to understand whether statist attitudes are more likely explained by 
differences within or across European countries. The intraclass correlation coefficient 
(ICC=0.28746) indicates that 97 percent of the variance are due to the individual-level, while 
3 percent are explained by the country-level. This means that support for state depends more 
on differences between Europeans than on differences between European countries. Though 
usual in multilevel analysis of welfare regimes (see e.g., Gelissen 2000; Arts and Gelissen 
2001), this first finding has some substantive interest. It contradicts culturalist explanations 
basically assuming that national traits are irreducible and that countries differ more than 
individuals. 
 
 
What Determines Support for State: Self-Interest and Symbolic Attitudes 
 
The literature about economic attitudes usually deals with two opposite explanations. 
According to the theory of hedonic rationality, economic attitudes are principally motivated 
by narrow self-interest (Hirschman 1997). Individuals develop economic preferences that are 
congruent with their personal interest, or at least with how they represent themselves their 
own interest. On the opposite, for the upholders of symbolic politics theory, economic 
attitudes are mostly driven by deeply rooted values and beliefs (e.g., Sears et al. 1980; Sears 
and Funk 1990). Notably, symbolic orientations have been argued to shape economic attitudes 
through organized schemes of ideological predispositions inherited from early socialization 
by parents and peer groups (e.g., Almond and Verba 1989; Inglehart 1990). 
Empirical studies on welfare attitudes have proved both explanations relevant. Higher 
levels of support for state have been observed among people identifying with the left or with 
left-wing parties (Jæger 2006; Jæger 2008), confirming that welfare preferences are strongly 
correlated with other ideological beliefs (Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Jacoby 1994; Gelissen 
2000) and can somehow be considered as attitudinal translations of general political values. 
Socially disadvantaged groups, notably transfer classes, have also been found to exhibit a 
stronger demand for public policies that they allegedly perceive as benefiting or protecting 
them (Papadakis and Bean 1993; Svallfors 1997; Edlund 1999). The same applies to the 
middle class, which is usually considered as providing the prime consumers of many social 
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services, such as education or health programs (Baldwin 1990; Svallfors and Taylor-Gooby 
1999). 
Here, we proceed in three stages. First assessing the self-interest hypothesis, we 
regress on statist attitudes with employment status and household income (Model 2). 
Household income is coded into quartiles. The wealthiest subgroup (Q4) is taken as a 
reference. A dummy variable grouping those who do not declare their income (Income 
DKNA) is added in order to keep and compare this important segment, accounting for 17 
percent of the sample. 
Then, we estimate the effect of political values to gauge whether symbolic orientations 
can moderate the influence of self-interest (Model 3). We use two subjective measurements. 
Political orientation is computed from self-positioning on a classical ten-point political scale. 
It is divided into four categories: left (1-4), center (5-6), right (7-10) used as a reference, plus 
one category (Political orientation DKNA) for those who do not declare their political 
orientation (about 24 percent of the total sample). As a proxy for political interest, we also 
introduce the additive index displayed in Figure 2. The least interested are taken as a 
reference. A dummy variable (Political interest DKNA) is added grouping the 7853 
respondents for which some observations lack to calculate the index (11.5 percent of the 
sample). 
Finally, trying to overcome the opposition between self-interest and political values, 
we focus on their combinations. With Model 4, we introduce a full interaction effect between 
income and political orientation to assess whether income exerts a differential influence over 
the Europeans who identify with the left and with the right. With Model 59, we evaluate 
another interaction. We let political interest vary depending on political orientation, to see if 
sophistication modulates support for state identically within each ideological group. 
In all the five models, gender, age and age at completion of education (playing here 
the part of a proxy for educational attainment) are added as control variables. Since the 
regressions are performed on a pooled file, we also add a dummy variable for each EVS wave 
(EVS 1999 and EVS 2008) to control for change and for the impact of the context over time. 
 
Table 2: Multilevel Analysis of Public Support for State in the European Union (1990-2008) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. 
Women     0.161*** (0.008)   0.151*** (0.008)    
Age (std)     -0.0035    (0.004)   0.0022    (0.004)    
Age completed educ. (std)     -0.053*** (0.004)   -0.054*** (0.004)    
Income - - (ref. ++)     0.280*** (0.013)   0.253*** (0.013)    
Income -     0.235*** (0.013)   0.214*** (0.012)    
Income +     0.144*** (0.013)   0.127*** (0.013)    
Income DKNA     0.095*** (0.014)   0.086*** (0.014)    
Worker (ref. Self-employed)     0.269*** (0.017)   0.237*** (0.017)    
Unemployed      0.563*** (0.023)   0.518*** (0.022)    
Retired or non-worker     0.266*** (0.018)   0.240*** (0.018)    
Employment status DKNA     0.275*** (0.038)   0.243*** (0.037)    
EVS 1999 (ref. EVS 1990)     0.171*** (0.009)   0.141*** (0.009)    
EVS 2008     0.264*** (0.009)   0.252*** (0.009)    
Left (ref. Right)         0.603*** (0.012)    
Center         0.276*** (0.010)    
Political orientation DKNA         0.316*** (0.012)    
Political interest - (ref. - -)         -0.028*   (0.011)    
Political interest +         -0.046*** (0.011)    
Political interest ++         -0.045*** (0.013)    
Political interest DKNA         0.061*** (0.016)    
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 Model 4 and Model 5 are not displayed here but available upon demand. 
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Intercept 0.00019    (0.035)    -0.674*** (0.034)   -0.886*** (0.016)    
  Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. 
Residual variance (individual-level) 0.971 (0.005) 0.933 (0.005) 0.895 (0.005) 
Random intercept variance (country-
level) 0.029 (0.008) 0.025 (0.007) 0.023 (0.007) 
N individual-level) 68472 65856 65856 
N (country-level) 23 23 23 
Intraclass correlation (%) 2.87 2.62 2.51 
Deviance  192410 182411 179692 
AIC 192416 182443 179738 
BIC 192443 182589 179947 
std=standardized; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001          
 
We can summarize Model 2 by saying that statist attitudes are strongly linked to social 
vulnerability. In tune with the literature about welfare attitudes, we find that the 
disadvantaged groups somehow follow their own interest and are more supportive of the state. 
Looking at income groups in the upper panel of Table 2, we note that the effect of income is 
quite linear. The lower the household income is, the more individuals endorse statist attitudes. 
As to employment status groups, compared to the self-employed, all Europeans are more 
likely to support public policies. It is especially the case of those who depend on state 
transfers or who indirectly benefit from them; i.e., the unemployed, the retired and the non-
workers. 
Moving to Model 3, we can point out the great influence of political orientation and 
hence confirm findings from previous scholars. Strictly comparing the magnitude of the 
estimates, self-identifying with the left rather than the right leads to support state more 
strongly than being poor or being unemployed. Political interest also has a significant but 
negative impact on public preferences. The most sophisticated segments of the European 
population are associated with a lower level of support for state10. But introducing political 
variables in the model does not deflate the coefficients for income and employment status. Put 
differently, self-interest and symbolic orientations both determine welfare attitudes. 
Turning now to control variables, we can notice that women are statistically more 
disposed than men to favor state intervention. This complies with the literature stating that 
women show more concern for equality and redistribution, but are often dependent on the 
state as well – whether they are the entitled recipients of social aids, whether they are public 
sector employees (Sainsbury 1996) –. While the beta for age does not approach statistical 
significance, the influence of age at completion of education is highly significant. Moving up 
on the scale of formal educational attainment increases the probability of supporting state. 
This is also the case for survey context. Holding the others explanatory variables fixed, the 
Europeans are much more interventionist in 2008 and in 1999 than in 199011. 
Though self-interest and political values both influence welfare attitudes, they are 
likely to interplay and exert a differential influence among subgroups. Figure 3 plots the 
                                                           
10
 Although the effect of political interest is modest in terms of standardized coefficients, it would be a mistake 
to assume that it is deflated by political orientation. The coefficients for political interest are the same when 
Model 3 is estimated without political orientation. However, one should stay cautious with comparing 
coefficients when attitudinal variables are introduced both sides of a regression model (in other words, when 
explaining attitudes with attitudes). Here, the statistical assumption that political orientation is uncorrelated with 
the error term (i.e., with the unobserved political attitudes that can also influence support for state) remains 
questionable (Jæger 2008). 
11
 Looking at the random effects, we can compute that Models 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively reduce the variance 
between individuals by 13, 20, 17 and 8 percent. And the variance between countries by 4, 8, 8, and 8 percent. 
As to models evaluation with standard statistical criteria (deviance, AIC, BIC), they all perform better than the 
empty model. 
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marginal predictions12 for Model 4, in which we let income vary between ideological groups. 
It shows that income has a highly contrasted impact on the left and on the right. While the 
rightist groups stick to their personal interest and are significantly less supportive of the state 
when they are rich, leftist groups tend to share the same degree of support and appear to be as 
statist whether they are rich or poor. In other words, political orientation moderates the 
influence of self-interest, but only among left-wing identifiers. So, the attitudinal gap between 
the rich and the poor is particularly wide among right-wingers. And poor right-wingers are 
significantly less averse to state intervention than their wealthy counterparts. 
This differential effect of income is very stable over time. It can be observed in 1990, 
1999 and 2008. This suggests that the political coalition on economic attitudes is much more 
solid within the left than within the right. On the right, the convergence of economic 
preferences seems to be strongly disrupted by income variations; the difference between poor 
and rich right-wingers being almost as large as the difference between poor right-wingers and 
poor left-wingers.  
 
Figure 3: Support for State for Ideological Groups Depending on Income (Predictive Margins 
with 95% Confidence Intervals) 
 
 
The influence of ideology on support for state is further reflected in the interaction 
between political orientation and political interest (Model 5). Figure 4 shows that leftist and 
rightist groups endorse welfare attitudes that are all the more polarized since they are 
interested in politics. Put another way, the attitudinal gap between the left and the right is the 
largest among the most politically interested segments of the European population; but this 
gap narrows as their political interest decreases. 
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 A marginal effect measures the change on the conditional mean of a dependent variable that is produced by a 
1-unit change in one of the explanatory variables. In linear regression models, it equals the slope coefficient. For 
a dummy independent variable, the marginal effect is the difference between predicted values at 1 and at 0 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Marginal effects can’t be estimated for interaction terms since the value of an 
interaction term can’t change separately from the values of its component terms. 
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The substantive finding here is that political interest plays a major role in shaping 
economic attitudes, by permitting individuals to convert their political predispositions into 
strong and divided statist opinions. Our results also suggest that the most politically aware 
tend to align on the pro- and anti-statist stances of their respective political elites, while the 
least sophisticated look the same and adopt average attitudes. This recalls that citizens are not 
equally permeable to the underlying ideological differences of their economic attitudes. 
 
Figure 4: Support for State for Ideological Groups Depending on Political Interest (Predictive 
Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals) 
 
 
Micro- and Macro-Dynamics of Support for State in the European 
Union 
 
From Parallel Publics and to Parallel Countries 
 
Multilevel modeling stresses two crucial results. Support for state is significantly more 
important in 2008 and 1999 than in 1990, but it is also significantly different among social 
groups. The “parallel publics” thesis entails a different story we now turn to. One blind spot 
of the overall movement of the Europeans toward more state is that it may conceal different, if 
not opposite changes among subgroups. This blind spot is well-known (see e.g., Page and 
Shapiro 1992; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002). The question therefore becomes: To 
what extent the liberal trend identified at an aggregated level, is mirrored among different 
subpublics? 
Figures 5 and 6 plot the regression lines drawn through scatterplots of predicted values 
for different social groups. These predictions stem from a model that replicates Model 3, but 
in which we also estimated the variance of random slopes for the EVS waves. Computing 
random slopes in addition to random intercepts is a next step in multilevel modeling. It deals 
with the fact that an explanatory variable may have a differential effect within levels, out of 
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its mean effect across levels. With Model 3bis, we let countries and waves vary together, thus 
testing the hypothesis that the influence of context on statist attitudes may be different from 
one country to another. The predicted values displayed in Figures 5 and 6 are computed from 
both individual- and country-levels. They include linear predictions from the fixed-effects 
part of the model and contributions based on predicted random effects. 
The two figures show a remarkably similar pattern. Between 1990 and 2008, all social 
groups have shifted toward more statist positions. This is true for gender and age groups. 
Employment and income groups appear to be more polarized, especially between the 
unemployed and the self-employed who exhibit a large gap in terms of predicted values. But 
both subpublics have developed an increasing support for state. The same applies to 
educational and ideological groups. Though the left and the right show very different levels of 
support, they evolve in concert. 
We can figure out more precisely the size of these gaps by projecting them on a ten-
point scale. For example, the gap between left- and rightwing identifiers represents a 
difference of 0.63 in terms of predicted values (the mean value equals -0.34 for rightists and 
0.29 for leftists). Since the range for predicted values equals 2.68 (-1.51 to +1.17), this 
difference would be tantamount to a gap of 2.35 on a ten-point scale (0.63x10/2.68). We can 
estimate the same way the gaps between the unemployed and the self-employed (2.57) or 
between the rich and the poor (1.38). Still, reasoning in terms of average predicted values is 
very misleading since mean values do not correspond to any real observation. Should we 
consider the more concrete gap between a leftist unemployed women and a rightist self-
employed man, it would represent more than half of a ten-point scale (5.15). The crucial result 
here is that even though they move in tandem, the Europeans remain fiercely divided over 
statist attitudes. 
 
Figure 5: Support for State for Different Subgroups Depending on EVS Wave (Predicted 
Values) 
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Figure 6: Support for State for Different Subgroups Depending on EVS Wave (Predicted 
Values) 
 
 
Figure 7 tells quite the same story of uniform movements across countries. It clearly 
shows that between 1990 and 2008, statist attitudes have been increasing in nineteen of our 
twenty-three countries. In Bulgaria, Portugal and Romania, the regression line is flat though 
slightly downward, suggesting that statist attitudes might be more stable than decreasing. The 
regression line is much steeper in United-Kingdom, confirming the Brits growing rejection of 
state intervention (Park and National Centre for Social Research 2012). Our results are 
somewhat at odds with post-materialist hypotheses assuming that individuals should be more 
and more attracted by personal autonomy and self-accomplishment values (Inglehart 1977). 
Contrasting with the idea that Europeans would gradually get free from the material need for 
state protection, we find that both materialist and post-materialist values may coexist in times 
of economic crisis. 
Another substantive finding stems from the random effects component of Model 3bis. 
In this model, the covariance between the intercepts and the slopes is highly significant, with 
a correlation of -0.9065. It means that the variations between the average levels of support for 
state among countries, are strongly and negatively linked with the variations between the 
average levels of supports among survey years. Put more simply, differences between the 
European countries tend to shorten from one EVS wave to the other13. This indicates a 
converging move of European Union countries toward an increasing demand for state 
protection, as one can guess by looking at the global graph displayed at the bottom right of 
Figure 7.  
 
                                                           
13
 We are therefore entitled to estimate random slopes in our further analysis. 
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Figure 7: Support for State in European Union Countries Depending on EVS Wave (Predicted 
Values) 
 
 
 
Who Moves when Support for State is Rising? 
 
Though our results tend to prove right the “parallel publics” thesis for the European 
case, one question remains unsettled: Have social groups been moving in the same 
proportions? Put differently, who makes the liberal mood move? In the literature, this 
question usually addresses elites influence within public opinion: How far the changes in the 
general public are driven by the changes of the most sophisticated or the most enlightened 
segments of the population, presumed as being the most responsive to changes (e.g., Enns and 
Kellstedt 2008)? 
We provide some answers with Figure 8. It compares the slope coefficients of the 
subpublics graphed in Figures 5 and 6. It also displays in which quartile of the predicted 
variable, the coefficient for each subgroup is located in 1990 and in 2008. It is a simple way 
of presenting the starting point, the direction and the amplitude of each subgroup movement. 
Figure 8 shows that all subgroups kind of move in tandem and roughly at the same speed, 
generally shifting from one quartile to the upper quartile. 
Two of the most averse subgroups to state intervention – i.e., the wealthiest 
respondents (0.41) and the right-wing identifiers (0.38) – display coefficients slightly superior 
to the average coefficient (0.28), perhaps indicating some kind of catching up with the 
prevailing pro-welfare opinion14. The same catch-up phenomenon with the liberal mood may 
                                                           
14
 In line with Ura and Ellis results (2008), this finding also suggests that the wealthy may show a higher 
responsiveness to their changing environment. 
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be at work among the most educated, which are shifting from Q1 to Q3. Still, since all 
educational groups show very similar coefficients, we can conclude with Enns and Kellsted 
(2008) that the most educated do not contribute to the overall change more than the others. 
Looking at the least mobile subgroups, we can notice that they are either alienated from 
politics (income DKNA, political interest DKNA), either distant from the labor market 
(retired, non-workers and somehow the self-employed); which might explain why there are 
less responsive to economic and political stimuli. 
Another important question is how intently the liberal mood moves? Coefficients 
displayed in Figure 8 may seem quite weak. Between 1990 and 2008, an “average” European 
will indeed see its statist score increase by 0.28 on a scale of predicted values ranging from -
1.51 to +1.17. Projected on a ten-point scale, it represents a minor shift of one point in 18 
years (0.28x10/2.68). However, as mentioned above, this is a very abstract reasoning. If we 
consider a leftist unemployed women, the slope coefficient would jump to 0.6 and entail a 
shift by 2.5 points on the same ten-point scale. Moreover, we must keep in mind that the shift 
predicted here is a systematic one. The same woman should in fact move by 2.5 points on all 
ten-point scales encompassed by the dependent variable; which is not the most likely outcome 
with regard to the non-ideological nature of economic attitudes. Still, our results are consistent 
with Page and Shapiro’s general thesis: Opinion changes are rare and proceed at a slow pace 
when they occur. 
 
Figure 8: Correlations between Support for State and EVS Waves 
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How Inequalities and Public Policies Shape Support for State 
 
Following the literature on welfare retrenchment and attitudes toward government in 
times of economic crisis (e.g., Svallfors and Taylor-Gooby 1999; Castles, Leibfried, and 
Lewis 2010), we posit that the increasing support for state expresses a growing demand for 
state protection in Europe. We also posit that this demand is a way for the general public to 
answer to inequalities rising or perceived as rising. Thus we elicit respondents living in 
countries being or becoming unequal to be more supportive of the state than respondents 
living in more equal countries. We also elicit public expenditure to play an important part. 
According to welfare regimes theory, we hypothesize that historically rooted architectures of 
welfare states promote peculiar norms and values among the public. Notably, we expect 
people living in social democratic welfare regimes (i.e., Denmark, Finland, Netherlands or 
Sweden) to exhibit a higher support for public spending (Larsen 2006). 
To test these hypotheses, we use the Gini coefficient from 1999 to 2008. Most of the 
information comes from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
Database (EU-SILC). It has been completed with World Income Inequality Database for the 
few countries where the Gini values were not documented by EU-SILC in 1999. From 
Eurostat Database, we also retrieve the total expenditure on social protection per head of 
population between 2000 and 2008. The influence of these macro-indicators on support for 
state is estimated with two different multilevel models. Gender, age, age at completion of 
education, income household and political orientation are introduced as control variables. 
Looking first at model 6 in Table 3, we can observe that, as expected, the Gini 
coefficient in 2008 has a significant impact on statist attitudes when individual variables are 
controlled for. The higher the Gini in a country, the more important the probability its 
inhabitants foster state intervention. It seems plausible to hypothesize that people living in 
unequal countries are inclined to endorse strong preferences for state protection and to favor 
generous public policies. 
More subtle variations appear when we consider the Gini evolution in Europe. One 
could think that the probability of supporting state would be higher in growing unequal 
countries. This is far from being the case. On the opposite, public demand is less important in 
countries where the Gini coefficient has been increasing between 1999 and 2008. This finding 
can be explained in two ways. First, it is consistent with the thermostatic model of 
responsiveness. When inequality rises, the general public responds by asking for less state 
intervention (Kelly and Enns 2010). Alternatively, our finding also complies with symbolic 
politics theory. Increasing inequalities usually weaken public trust in institutions. Thus they 
may lower support for state intervention. 
Since we have computed a cross-level interaction between low-income and Gini 
evolution, we can assume that this effect is particularly relevant for the poor. They are 
significantly less in favor of state intervention when they leave in a country where income 
inequalities have been rising. This result also suggests that sociotropic preferences matter and 
that they can even offset the influence of egotropic preferences15. We have also tested the 
linear combination between Gini and social expenses evolutions, to assess whether increasing 
social expenses can moderate increasing inequalities. But this variable does not appear to be 
significant16. 
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 With sociotropic evaluations, individuals mostly take into account the overall performance of their economy 
(Kiewiet 1983). 
16
 The significance of the coefficients is a tricky question in multilevel models since tests of significance with 
standard-errors are not relevant for the variance components. Macro-level variables raise another problem. Since 
we have an exhaustive list of countries, we should strictly speaking neglect statistical inference and focus on 
comparing the coefficients. 
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The impact of social expenses is not congruent with what is expected. Model 7 shows 
that public demand for state protection is lower among people living in countries with strong 
spending on social protection in 2008 (in descending order, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, 
Netherlands, Austria, Finland, France and Belgium). This somewhat contradicts welfare 
regimes theory. As Figure 6 also illustrates, support for state can indeed be higher in Eastern 
and Southern Europe than in social democratic or Christian welfare regimes. Still, we find the 
unemployed to be significantly more supportive of state in countries with high social 
expenses. This demonstrates that all subpublics do not necessarily develop the same attitudes 
toward welfare policy. In some cases, self-interest may prevail over social norms originating 
from institutional arrangements. 
Model 7 also highlights that public spending evolution does not necessarily moderate 
public demand for state intervention. Rather, support for state significantly increases when 
social expenses increase. Although we also find that the unemployed exhibit a decreasing 
support for state in countries with increasing social expenses, the crucial result here is that the 
general public does not always follow a thermostatic pattern – i.e., claim for less state 
protection when social spending grows, and vice versa (Soroka and Wlezien 2004; Brooks 
and Manza 2007) –. Notably, computing a linear combination between Gini and social 
expenses evolutions, we find that support for state not only raises when social expenses 
increase, but also raises when Gini increases along with social expenses. This demonstrates 
that even if rising income inequalities exert a strong moderating influence on support for state, 
this influence is not sufficient to counteract the leverage effect of increasing social expenses 
on public demand for state. 
 
Table 3: Multilevel Analysis of Public Support for State in the European Union (1990-2008) 
  Model 6 Model 7 
  Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. 
Women 0.187*** (0.007) 0.187*** (0.007) 
Age (std) -0.00972*   (0.004) -0.0101*   (0.004) 
Age completed education (std) -0.0755*** (0.004) -0.0760*** (0.004) 
Political orientation (std) -0.106*** (0.004) -0.106*** (0.004) 
Income (std) -0.0671*** (0.003) -0.0664*** (0.003) 
EVS 1999 (ref. EVS 1990) 0.176*** (0.029) 0.177*** (0.029) 
EVS 2008 0.266*** (0.055) 0.265*** (0.055) 
GINI (std) 0.0853**  (0.029)     
GINI evolution (std) -0.0832** (0.027)     
Income -- x GINI (std) 0.0001    (0.009)     
Income -- x GINI evolution (std) -0.0227*   (0.099)     
Social expenses (std)     -0.0817**  (0.030)    
Social expenses evolution (std)     0.0646*   (0.030)    
GINI evolution x Social expenses evolution (std) 0.0618    (0.027)    0.0687*   (0.033)    
Unemployed x Social expenses (std)     0.0755*** (0.017)    
Unemployed x Social expenses evolution (std)     -0.0415*   (0.016)    
Intercept 0.213*** (0.049)    0.212*** (0.054)    
  Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. 
Residual variance (individual-level) 0.921 (0.005) 0.921 (0.005) 
Random intercept variance (country-level) 0.114 0.036 0.133 (0.041) 
Variance slope (EVS wave) 0.017 (0.005) 0.017 (0.005) 
Covariance random intercept/slope (EVS wave)  -0.041 (0.013)  -0.045 (0.014) 
N individual-level) 65856 65856 
N (country-level) 23 23 
Intraclass correlation coefficient (%) 1.81 1.83 
Deviance  181670 181661 
AIC 181704 181695 
BIC 181859 181850 
std=standardized; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001         
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Discussion and Conclusion  
 
 A growing body of empirical studies have investigated economic attitudes in the US 
since the 70s. Using comparable data in twenty-three countries of the European Union, the 
results presented in this article strongly confirm for the European case most of what previous 
scholars have shown for the American case. 
While the popular belief depicts Europeans as averse to capitalism and nurtured by a 
“passion for equality”, we find that their economic attitudes are not as consistent as one might 
think. Though distrust of capitalism is growing among European countries, Europeans are not 
“ideological”. They do not perceive liberal and conservative preferences as exclusive. This 
substantive finding can be reconciled with recent studies demonstrating that most Americans 
are “conservative egalitarians” and mix philosophical conservatism with operational 
liberalism (Bartels 2008; Page and Jacobs 2009; Marsden 2012). 
Our results also comply with the literature about over-time parallelism in attitudinal 
changes. Between 1990 and 2008, all Europeans have moved in quite the same proportions 
toward more support for state. The EVS data used in this article hence provide no evidence of 
economic values convergence among subgroups. With regard to statist attitudes, huge 
differences remain within the European public and these differences have basically been 
translated. We notably observe a wide, permanent attitudinal gap between the left and the 
right. In addition, this gap increases when leftists and rightists are more interested in politics. 
Contrary to the scientific belief that ideological cleavages have been weakening in Old 
Europe (Clark and Lipset 2001), our results lead to the conclusion that ideology still matters; 
and even seems to matter much for the Europeans when it comes to statist attitudes. 
However, these parallel movements are not necessarily driven by similar rationales. 
The “parallel publics” thesis assumes that subpublics have a common understanding of 
economic and political stimuli coming from their environment. Thus they can respond 
accordingly and move in the same direction. Our results only partly verify this assumption. 
On one hand, we find that the poor and the general public evenly react to rising inequalities 
by becoming more statist. But on the other hand, we also find that the general public is more 
supportive of state when social expenses increase, while the unemployed become less statist. 
The same kind of discrepancy may be at work between left- and rightwing Europeans. Even 
though they both display an increasing support for state at the aggregate level, they may 
become more statist for very different reasons. Qualitative methods could bring further 
insights on how social groups perceive state responsibility in times of economic crisis. In-
depth interviews would also prove relevant to probe into the arguments people advance when 
they oppose the liberal mood. 
Our findings are finally useful for policy makers since they help to understand why 
welfare retrenchment remains a controversial issue in Europe. It is tempting to consider the 
growing support for state as a popular reply to what is sometimes pictured as a conservative 
consensus of the political elites. We must stress that these parallel publics do not really 
constitute parallel, silent majorities. European public opinion remains very composite. It 
combines an increasing demand for state with deeply rooted conservative preferences. So, 
what is at stake with the liberal mood may not only be the growing mismatch between 
citizens’ expectations and the capacity of European political elites to respond to them. But, 
more subtly, the capacity of elites to meet the public’s growing demand for state protection 
without upsetting its conservative views of the economic realm. 
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Support Information 
 
Summary of Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Wording Type Mean (1) Standard deviation (1) 
(1) Competition is good. It stimulates people to work 
hard and develop new ideas (10) Competition is 
harmful, it brings out the worst in people 
Numerical 
(1-10) 4,15 2,33 
(1) Private ownership of business and industry should 
be increased (10) Government ownership of business 
and industry should be increased 
Numerical 
(1-10) 4,89 2,30 
(1) Individuals should take more responsibility for 
providing for themselves (10) The state should take 
more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided 
for 
Numerical 
(1-10) 4,70 2,57 
(1) People who are unemployed should have to take any 
job available or lose their unemployment benefits (10) 
People who are unemployed should have the right to 
refuse a job they do not want 
Numerical 
(1-10) 4,50 2,69 
(1) Incomes should be made more equal (10) There 
should be greater incentives for individual effort 
Numerical 
(1-10) 5,95 2,75 
(1) I find that both freedom and equality are important. 
But if I were to choose one or the other, I would 
consider personal freedom more important, that is, 
everyone can live in freedom and develop without 
hindrance (2) Certainly both freedom and equality are 
important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I 
would consider equality more important, that is, that 
nobody is underprivileged and that social class 
differences are not so strong (3) Neither 
Categorical 
(1, 2, 3)  -   -  
(1) European Union 2008, n=27. 
      
 
 
Evolution of Conservative Positions on Economic Issues Depending on Countries (%, ∆ 
2008-1990)  
 
  
Competition 
good (1-4) 
Private 
ownership 
increased (1-4) 
Incentives to 
individual 
efforts (7-
10) 
Freedom 
above 
equality 
Unemployed 
take any job 
(1-4) 
Individual 
responsibility 
(1-4) 
Austria -20 -29 -33 -12 -10 -19 
Belgium -7 -6 -7 -5 5 -7 
Bulgaria -8 -24 8 13 30 3 
Czech 
Republic -24 -23 -30 -14 6 -7 
Denmark 0 -10 7 2 -4 -11 
Estonia -17 -31 -30 -14 20 7 
Finland -24 -28 -32 -19 -23 -6 
France -19 -13 -2 -7 -21 -10 
Germany -2 -19 -31 -7 8 5 
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Great 
Britain 2 -5 -21 -6 18 23 
Hungary -17 -36 -21 3 16 7 
Ireland -8 -14 -23 0 2 8 
Italy -9 -12 1 -3 0 -9 
Latvia -18 -27 -11 -10 20 14 
Lithuania -26 -13 -37 -20 9 20 
Netherlands -7 -3 -6 6 10 -2 
Poland -14 -12 -38 4 -4 3 
Portugal -2 -9 10 -1 1 11 
Romania -8 -3 -39 6 10 15 
Slovak 
Republic -6 -18 -18 -1 17 16 
Slovenia -11 -14 -33 22 -8 7 
Spain -16 -16 -3 6 -14 -2 
Sweden -8 -7 -30 -8 -9 -19 
European 
Union (23) -10 -15 -18 -3 1 1 
 
 
Coefficient Estimates for Multilevel Linear Regression Models 
  Model 4 Model 5 
  Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Women 0.152*** (20.15)    0.151*** (19.85)   
Age (std) -0.000521   (-0.12)    0.0102*   (2.37)    
Age completed educ. (std) -0.058*** (-13.97)   -0.066*** (-15.91)   
Worker (ref. Self-employed) 0.236*** (13.80)    0.244*** (14.25)   
Unemployed  0.523*** (23.25)    0.565*** (25.17)   
Retired or non-worker 0.245*** (13.82)    0.277*** (15.63)   
Employment status DKNA 0.246*** (6.58)    0.282*** (7.54)    
EVS 1999 (ref. EVS 1990) 0.164*** (17.91)    0.133*** (13.52)   
EVS 2008 0.250*** (26.63)    0.222*** (23.62)   
Left (ref. Right) 0.926*** (36.99)    0.356*** (12.52)   
Center 0.416*** (18.28)    0.190*** (7.90)    
Political orientation DKNA 0.475*** (14.59)    0.213*** (8.79)    
Income - - (Q1) (ref. ++) 0.452*** (18.04)        
Income - (Q2) 0.426*** (17.54)        
Income + (Q3) 0.253*** (9.65)        
Income DKNA 0.287*** (10.45)        
Left*Q1 -0.441*** (-12.63)       
Left*Q2 -0.427*** (-12.51)       
Left*Q3 -0.292*** (-7.88)        
Left*Income DKNA -0.476*** (-12.22)       
Center*Q1 -0.171*** (-5.48)        
Center*Q2 -0.211*** (-6.88)        
Center*Q3 -0.122*** (-3.66)        
Center*Income DKNA -0.195*** (-5.60)        
Political orientation DKNA*Q1 -0.215*** (-5.48)        
Political orientation DKNA*Q2 -0.231*** (-5.85)        
Political orientation DKNA*Q3 -0.123**  (-2.86)        
Political orientation DKNA*Income DKNA -0.179*** (-4.24)        
Political interest - (ref. - -)     -0.0822**  (-2.98)    
Political interest +     -0.182*** (-7.28)    
26 
Political interest ++     -0.317*** (-11.77)   
Political interest DKNA     -0.0154    (-0.46)    
Left*Political interest-     0.112**  (2.91)    
Left*Political interest+     0.272*** (7.73)    
Left*Political interest++     0.622*** (16.83)   
Left*Political interest DKNA     0.0467    (1.01)    
Center*Political interest-     0.0315    (0.96)    
Center*Political interest+     0.107*** (3.53)    
Center*Political interest++     0.193*** (5.73)    
Center*Political interest DKNA     0.0402    (1.02)    
Political orientation DKNA*Political interest-     0.0557    (1.61)    
Political orientation DKNA*Political interest+     0.131*** (3.88)    
Political orientation DKNA*Political interest++   0.145*** (3.84)    
Political orientation DKNA*Political interest DKNA   0.0888*   (2.19)    
Intercept -1.062*** (-26.54)   -0.624*** (-14.47)   
  Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. 
Residual variance (individual-level) 0.892 (0.005) 0.895 (0.005) 
Random intercept variance (country-level) 0.238 (0.007) 0.265 (0.008) 
N individual-level) 65856 65856 
N (country-level) 23 23 
Intraclass correlation coefficient (%) 2.60 2.88 
Deviance -179503 -179717 
AIC 179565 179779 
BIC 179847 180061 
std=standardized; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001       
 
 
 
 
 
 
